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I.

INTRODUCTION

On October 11, 1974, Respondent (hereinafter referred
to as Plaintiff) caused a writ of attachment to be issued
against one D-9 caterpillar in order to satisfy judgments
previously obtained against Defendants General American Corporation (hereinafter referred to as GAC) and its President, Paul J.
Angelos.

Subsequently, Appellant (hereinafter referred to as

Intervenor) moved to intervene in the present action--claiming
that GAC had sold the aforementioned caterpillar to a Terra
Corporation and that Terra Corporation had resold the caterpillar
to Intervenor.

Intervenor claims that he is a bona fide good

faith purchaser of the caterpillar and that, therefore, Plaintiff
wrongfully attached and levied on the caterpillar.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that Utah Code
Ann.

§

25-1-15 (1953) establishes her right to attach the cater-

pillar and to execute on that attachment.

It provides that:

Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent
as to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim
has matured, may, as against any person, except
a purchaser for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud at the time of the purchase or
one who has derived title immediately or mediately
from such a purchaser:
(1) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation
annulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his
claim; or,
(2) Disregard the conveyance, and attach, or levy
execution upon, the property conveyed.
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Section 25-1-15, of course, presupposes th

e existence
1

of a fraudulent conveyance under Utah Code Ann. § 25

-1-4 (1953),
However, the essence of a fraudulent conveyance under § _1-4
25

is the same "fair consideration" concept which provides

the basis I
for determining whether Intervenor can qualify for the good faitr
purchaser exception under§ 25-1-15.

Therefore, discussionof

I

§ 25-1-4' s requirements will serve to establish both the existenc:
of a fraudulent conveyance under § 25-1-4 and the failure
of Intervenor to qualify under the good faith purchaser exception
Of§ 25-1-15.l
II.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT GAC FRAUDULENTLY CONVEYED THE CATERPILLAR TO TERRA
CORPORATION AND THAT INTERVENOR DID NOT PURCHASE THE
CATERPILLAR FOR "FAIR CONSIDERATION" FROM TERRA CORPORATION.
A.

Scope of Review.

The question confronting the

Court on this appeal:
is whether the circumstances urged by the
[Intervenor as mitigating against a finding of
fraudulent conveyance] do so with such certainty
that the [lower court] could not reasonably have
believed the [Plaintiff's] evidence to the contrary . • . .
It is to be borne in mind that ~n
pursuing the duty of reviewing the evidence in a
case in equity, this court makes considerable
allowance for the advantaged position of the.
[lower court] in close proximity to the parties
and the witnesses which provides [it] a better

Plaintiff does not dispute Intervenor's contention th~\:~uritY
ownership interest takes precedence over an unperfe~tef t _7,
3
interest in personal property.
See Intervenor 's Brie acourt's
However, this contention is rendered moot by the lower a
ruling that GAC' s conveyance of the caterpi· 11 ar to Terr
t
pillar
Corporation and Terra Corporation's resale of th7 d ca e~gainst
to Intervenor were fraudulent and, therefore, voi as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Plaintiff.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
1
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basis for insight into the truthfulness of the
testimony offered than is afforded by a review
of the record. Givan v. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959,
964 (Utah 1960).
It is primarily for these reasons that the Court should not
reverse unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the
lower court's findings.

See Nelson v. Nelson, 513 P.2d 1011,

1013 (Utah 1973); Brimhall v. Grow, 480 P.2d 731, 734 (Utah
1971); and Givan v. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 959, 960 (Utah 1960).

B.

The Evidence.

Plaintiff prevailed in the lower

court on her claim that GAC fraudulently conveyed the caterpillar to Terra Corporation and Intervenor in violation of
Utah Code Ann.

§

25-1-4 (1953)

Conclusions of Law, R. 210-214).

(see Findings of Fact and
Section 25-1-4 provides that:

Every conveyance made, and every obligation
incurred, by a person who is, or will be
thereby rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as
to creditors, without regard to his actual
intent, if the conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair consideration.
Both the statute and case law interpreting the statute
make i t clear that subjective or actual intent to defraud are
not elements of a fraudulent conveyance claim.

See First Security

Bank of Utah v. Vrontikis Bros., Inc., 490 P.2d 1301, 1302 (Utah
1971) and Ned J. Bowman v. White, 369 P.2d 962, 963 (Utah 1962).

Plaintiff is obligated

to show only (1) that she was a creditor

of GAC; (2) that GAC was insolvent at the time the conveyance
was made; and (3) that the conveyance was not made for a "fair
consideration."

This showing can be made "from the facts of each

case and from the circumstances surrounding the transaction

~-

Plaintiff submits that there is sufficient evidence in the
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
to Sponsored
make bythis
showing.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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II

(1)

Creditor.

A "creditor" is defined under the

Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act as follows:

"

a person

having any claim, whether matured or unmatured, liquidated or
unliquidated, absolute, fixed, or contingent."
§

25-1-1 (1953).

Utah Code Ann.

Intervenor does not challenge Plaintiff's

status as a GAC creditor (R. 234 Ls. 19-23).

Moreover, the

promissory note (Exhibit 19-P) executed by GAC in favor of
Plaintiff adequately demonstrates that Plaintiff was a GAC
creditor.
( 2)

Insolvency.

The Utah Frau'dulent Conveyances

Act defines "insolvency" as follows:
A person is insolvent when the present fair
salable value of his assets is less than the
amount that will be required to satisfy his
probable liability on his existing debts as
they become absolute and matured. Utah Code
Ann. § 25-1-2 (1953).
GAC's insolvency at the time it conveyed the caterpillar to
Terra Corporation is adequately reflected in the record on
appeal.
First, Intervenor's own witness, Edward Coltharp, a
stock broker who traded GAC stock, and a shareholder in GAC,
testified that there was no market for GAC stock (R. 302) •
This market inactivity was one indication of GAC's failing
financial condition.
. h ou t obJ' ection,
Second, Plaintiff testified, wit

that

in February 1974 she loaned $12, 000. 00 (Exhibit 19-P) to GAC
1"

318 LS··'
because of GAC's inactive and l.·nsolvent condi"ti'on (R.
a nr·:
ct that GAC ha ..
This condition is further reflected by the fa
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L

filed annual reports with the Utah Secretary of State's office
since 1971 and had not paid franchise taxes to the Utah State
Tax cormnission since 1970 and, therefore, these government
agencies had revoked GAC's certificate of authority to do
business in Utah (Affidavit of David

s.

Cook in support of

Motion to Dismiss Counter-Claim of GAC, R. 27).
Third, Plaintiff testified, without objection, that
in the spring and summer of 1974 GAC failed to make any payments
on her loan (R. 328 L. 30 and R. 329 Ls. 1-4).
Feeney, 192 A.2d 351, 353 (Pa. 1963)

See Larrimer v.

("Insolvency in the equity

sense ... is the inability to meet obligations as they mature").
See also, Utah Code Ann.

§

25-1-5 (1953).

Finally, Plaintiff testified that her examination of
GAC records revealed that GAC liabilities exceeded GAC assets
(R. 34 Ls. 14-29).

Intervenor objects to the admission of this

testimony, claiming that it violates the best evidence rule
found at Utah Code Ann.
Brief at 9-10.

§

78-25-16 (1953).

See Intervenor's

Plaintiff has several observations with respect

to this objection.
First, even without this testimony, as indicated above,
there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to

support

the lower court's finding that GAC was insolvent at the time
it conveyed the caterpillar to Terra Corporation; and this

evidence was not contradicted by Intervenor at trial.
Second, both

§

78-25-16 and Utah Rules of Evidence 70

make an exception to the best evidence principle "when the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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original has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof of
the loss or destruction must first be made."
§ 78-25-16 (1)

(1953).

Utah Code Ann.

This exception is consistent with the

basic premise of the best evidence rule:
The production-of-documents rule is principally
aimed, not at securing a writing at all hazards
and in every instance, but at securing the best
obtainable evidence of its contents. Thus, if
as a practical matter the document cannot be
produced because it has been lost or destroyed,
the production of the original is excused and
other evidence of its contents becomes admissable.
Failure to recognize this qualification of the
basic rule would in many instances mean a return
to the bygone and unlamented days in which to lose
one's paper was to lose one's right. Recognition
of the same qualification also squares with the
ancillary purpose of the basic rule to protect
against the perpetration of fraud, since proof
that failure to produce the original is due to
inability to do so tends logically to dispel the
otherwise possible inference that the failure
stems from design.
(Emphasis in original.)
D. McCormick, McCormick' s Handbook of the Law of
Evidence§ 237 at 570 (2d Ed. 1972).

i
I

Given this premise, courts generally require a reason· 1I
ably diligent search for original documentary evidence before \
secondary evidence to prove the content of writings is admitted.:
Id. at 570-571.

Questions relative to the adequacy of this

search are matters largely within the trial court's discretion.
"Such discretion is particularly appropriate since the character
of the search required to show the probability of loss or
circum·
destruction will, as a practical matter, depend on the
·a nee
stances of each case." Id. See also, J. H. Wigmore, ~
§ 1194 at 442 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972)

. of
( " • . . th e determination

thi

fact of ioss sh'.
sufficiency of the search and in general of the
. ") (emphasis ;[.
be
left entirely to the trial court's discretion
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
· approach. see
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
original). Utah has apparently followed t h is

Stevens v. Gray, 259 P. 2d 889, 891 (Utah 1953)

("Ordinarily,

if an explanation of failure to produce such record is satisfactory

to the trial court it is within his discretion to receive other
evidence concerning such facts") .

Indeed, modern authorities

suggest that it is a "waste of time" for appellate courts to
review such discretionary rulings.
§

See J. H. Wigrnore, Evidence

1195 at 445-446 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972).

McCormick Handbook of the Law of Evidence
&l. 1972)

See also, D. McCormick,
§

243 at 577-578 (2d

(Admission of secondary evidence is harmless error in

absence of good faith dispute relative to accuracy of secondary
evidence).
The record shows that Plaintiff made an adequate search
for GAC's business records (R.339-340).

These records were in

the custody of GAC's president, Paul J. Angelos (R. 340 Ls. 10-12).
Mr. Angelos, who was an adverse party in this action (R. 2-7)
refused to grant Plaintiff access to these records (R. 339 Ls.
27-30 R. 340 Ls. 1-3), even after Plaintiff had made requests

for their production (R. 30-31) .

This fact alone is sufficient

to justify the lower court's admission of the disputed testimony.
See J. H. Wigmore, Evidence

§

1212 at 487 (Chadbourn Rev. 1972)

("It is also often said that where the third person is hostile

and fraudulently detains the document, this fact of itself
suffices to excuse nonproduction, although such an instance is
perhaps equally well disposed of by the doctrine of loss • • • ")
(emphasis in original) .
188 P.2d 742, 744

See also Snow v. Utah Automobile Dealers,

(Utah 1948). Additionally, Mr. Angelos had left

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the country; and, although he had come back to the United
States, it was impossible to locate him (R. 340 Ls. 16-17).
The lower court could reasonably have inf erred from these
circumstances that Mr. Angelos was not within the State of
Utah.

Again, this fact alone is sufficient to justify the

lower court's admission of the disputed testimony.

See Utah

Rules of Evidence 70 (1) (b); Johnson v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 100 P. 390, 395 (Utah 1909)

(" ..• the letter in

question was not within the jurisdiction of the court, and the
rule, as declared by the great weight of authority, is that
when a writing which is necessary in evidence is traced to
the hands of a party not within the State, secondary evidence,
without further showing, may be given to prove the contents
of such writing") ; and Dwyer v. Salt Lake City Copper Mfg·
Co., 47 P. 811, 812

(Utah 1896).

Finally, Plaintiff made

personal efforts to locate Mr. Angelos (R. 340

extensive

I

Ls. 18-25).

This evidence justifies the lower court's exercise!

of discretion in admitting the disputed testimony.
( 3)

Fair Consideration.

The Utah Fraudulent Conver

ances Act defines "fair consideration" as follows:
Fair consideration is given for property, or
obligation:
(1)
When in exchange for such property,
or obligation, as a fair equivalent therefor,
and in good faith, property is conveyed or ~n
antecedent debt is satisfied
Utah Co~
Ann. § 25-1-3 (1953).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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J

L

Section 25-1-3 requires that the conveyance be made
for both a "fair equivalence" and in "good faith."

Thus, a

showing that either of these elements is lacking is sufficient
to support the lower court's finding of fraudulent conveyance
in the present case.
(a) Fair Equivalence.

Although this court has

indicated that fair equivalence does not mean exact equivalence
or equal value, "fair valuation [does] mean such a price as a
capable and diligent businessman could presently obtain for the
property after conferring with those accustomed to buy such
property" Utah Assets Corporation v. Dooley Brothers Association,
70 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1937).

Thus, for example, this court has

upheld a lower court' s finding that giving $ 3 8 , 12 0. 0 0 in exchange
for property with a proven worth of $290,000.00 (only 13% of the
property's proven worth) was not a fair equivalence.

See First

Security Bank of Utah v. Vrontikis Brothers, Inc., 490 P.2d 1301
(Utah 1971).

Judged by this standard, the caterpillar's sale

price to both Terra Corporation and Intervenor ($2,500.00) was
grossly disproportionate to the caterpillar's real value ($20,000.00
to $ 30 , 0 0 O. OO) .
Intervenor attacks the lower court's finding that the
caterpillar was not sold for a fair equivalence on two grounds.
First, Intervenor suggests that the court erred in basing its
fair equivalence finding on retail rather than wholesale value.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Intervenor fails to cite any case supporting the proposition t
wholesale rather than retail value should be used in ascertab.;
I

the fair equivalence of an alleged fraudulent conveyance. Th:,
failure is not surprising in light of the Dooley court's fair !
equivalence standard:

"Such a price as a capable and diligent:
I

businessman could presently obtain for the property after con:':~
with those accustomed to buy such property."

Utah Assets cor ::.

v. Dooley Brothers Association, 70 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1937),
In seeming anticipation of this standard, Intervenor himself :
testified that "I had the tractor sold for $20, 000, so that
establishes a pretty good value."
R.

279 Ls. 13-19.)

(R.

278 Ls. 27-28.

See als: !

2

In addition to his own testimony on this point,
Intervenor produced two experts at trial.

One expert, Mr.

Coltharp, testified that the caterpillar's value was $20,000
to $25,000 (R. 301 Ls. 21-29).

Intervenor's other expert,

Mr. Bateman, whose testimony is set forth in part in Intervenor'!
:

Brief at 7-8, testified that the caterpillar's wholesale value
was approximately $10,750; but Mr. Bateman further testifiedtn:
brokers of heavy equipment would raise this price to "whatever~
2 According to Intervenor's Deposition, this $20'.0?0 price w~:tii
based on the caterpillar in its present unrehab1litat7d c~~at
(McCurtain Deposition at 26).
Intervenor ~urther admi~! worth
when necessary repairs are made the caterpillar could . oepo·
as much as $30,000 (R. 290 Ls. 17-24. See also McCurtain
sition at 42).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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j

market would stand." (R. 260 L. 8.)

3

This evidence reveals considerable disparity between
the caterpillar's fair value and the amount Intervenor actually
paid for the caterpillar.

Thus, it was not unreasonable for

the lower court to rule that "fair consideration" was not given
in exchange for the caterpillar.

Even accepting Intervenor's

wholesale figure of $10,750, it would not be unreasonable for
the lower court to conclude that 25% of value was not "fair
consideration" under the circumstances of the present case.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that each decision
as to the fairness of consideration in fraudulent conveyance
cases must be made from the standpoint of creditors.

se·e Larrirner

v. Feeney, 192 A.2d 351, 354 (Pa. 1963) and Osawa v. Orishi,
206 P. 2d 498, 504 (Wash. 1949).
Second, Intervenor contends that he paid more than
$2,500 for the caterpillar because he had an oral agreement to

split profits with H. E. Thomas, president of Terra Corporation,
in the event that Intervenor resold the caterpillar.

However, the

lower court could have found this testimony implausible for
several reasons.
3

It is
to the
t~ the
sisted

possible that the lower court attached greater weight
testimony of Intervenor and Mr. Coltharp with respect
caterpillar's value because (1) counsel for Intervenor inii;i his opening remarks that "the evidence wil~ sho~ the
tr~ctor is worth approximately $20, 000-twenty to thirty is my
client's opinion and he is a dealer"
(R. 236 Ls. 25-57)
(even on appeal, Intervenor insists that, for purposes of
~ssessing wrongful attachment damages against Plaintiff $20,000
is the proper figure, see Intervenor's Brief at 11-12); and
because (2) Mr. Bateman's testimony was substantially impeached
at trial (R. 261-270).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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First, the written documents accompanying Terra
Corporation's sale of the caterpillar to Intervenor made no
mention of a profit sharing agreement.

Indeed, the bill of

sale (Exhibit 16-D) specifically recites that the "caterpillar
is free and clear of any liens, claims or demands of any persa:
whatsoever .•• "
Second, after purchasing the caterpillar from Terra
i

Corporation, Intervenor pledged it for a $6,000 bank loan. Thi::
I

pledge agreement bore only Intervenor's and not Terra Corporat:::I
signature

(R. 289 Ls. 18-23).

It seems improbable that a ba~'. !

would loan $6, 000 without first ascertaining and binding every !
party who had any interest in the loan collateral.
pledge agreement (R. 182) specifically recites at

Indeed, the
paragu~S

that "the debtor is ... the owner of the collateral ... [and]
the collateral is ..• free and clear of all liens, claims, char::!

encumbrances, taxes and assessments,"

and at paragroph 71•11ll

Intervenor promises to "keep the collateral free from all liens, I
claims, charges, encumbrances, taxes and assessments."
Finally, the profit sharing agreement is arguably
inconsistent with Intervenor's testimony that he purchased the
caterpillar "sight unseen" because of its extraordinarily ~w
price (R. 296 Ls. 21-27.

See also R. 284 Ls. 27-30).

All of these facts could have persuaded the lower
corpora tic
court that the caterpillar was not purchased by Terra
· of
and Intervenor for a "fair equivalence" within the meaning
the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act.
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I
r

(b)

Good Faith.

Not only must Intervenor show that

there was insufficient evidence to support the lower court's
findings with respect to the "fair equivalence" issue, but also
Intervenor must show the same insufficiency with respect to the
"good faith" of the Terra Corporation-Intervenor transaction.
Intervenor claims that he purchased the caterpillar
in "good faith" because "there is no evidence in the record
indicating [Intervenor] had previous knowledge of any fraudulent intent."

Intervenor's Brief at 9.

However, the statute

which Intervenor relies on in support of this claim does not
speak in terms of "previous knowledge" but rather in terms of
"previous notice."

See Utah Code Ann.

§

25-1-13 (1953).

In

Utah "whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put
[Intervenor] on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of
everything to which such inquiry might have led."
Thompson, 261 P.2d 288, 290 (Utah 1948).

McGarry v.

There was consider-

able evidence at trial from which the lower court could have
found that Intervenor was put on notice that all was not right
with respect to his purchase of the caterpillar.
1.

Intervenor himself testified that the caterpillar's

low purchase price was unusual.
Q.

Mr. McCurtain, you've said that this was a

normal transaction.
"normal."

I'm confused by what you meant as

Is it normal to purchase a caterpillar tractor

for 10% of its value in the trade; is that a normal
transaction in your dealings in heavy equipment, or is
that a little unusual to have that kind of a deal?
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A.

That is unusual.

(R. 296 Ls. 21-27.)

In fact, the caterpillar's purchase price was
so unusually low that Intervenor did not bother to inspect
the caterpillar before purchasing it.
Q.

Is it your custom, Mr. McCurtain, to purchase

heavy equipment sight unseen?
A.

When they' re as low priced as that equipment

is, it certainly is.

(R.

284 Ls. 27-30.

See also R.

288 Ls. 20-25.)
2.

There was evidence to suggest that the Terra

Corporation-Intervenor transaction was a "sham"; and that,
despite the appearance of a conveyance from Terra Corporation
to Intervenor, GAC and Terra Corporation actually retained
"possession" of the caterpillar.

The Utah Fraudulent Conveyanc'i

Act defines this circumstance as "conclusive evidence of frauc
as against ••. creditors •.• "

J

Utah Code Ann. § 25-1-14 (1953),
i

See also, Givan v. Lambeth, 251 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah 1960) (defi:
this circumstance as a "badge of fraud").
Terra Corporation purportedly sold the caterpillar tc
Intervenor on July 9, 1974 (Exhibits 15-D and 16-D).

1

However,

the caterpillar was hauled at Terra Corporation's request into!

I

Wheeler Machinery Company's yard on July 18, 1974 (R. 24?L
23 and Exhibits 2-D and 3-D.

5

··1

See also R. 252 Ls. 3-12). There-

after, GAC and Terra Corporation principals requeste
.

d Mr sat(

·

· 11 r (R. 269

a heavy equipment dealer, to inspect the caterpi a
I
Bateman to make ,
Ls. 10-13) • These same principals wanted Mr.
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t

offer to purchase the caterpillar (R. 270 Ls. 4-6).

In October,

1974, these principals requested a Burt Gallo to do repair work

on the caterpillar (Affidavit of Juanita J. Meyer in Opposition
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ,, 11, R. 83-88) and
GAC's attorney proposed to Plaintiff that GAC sell the caterpillar
to a buyer in Emery County, Utah and split the proceeds with
Plaintiff (Id. ,, 13).

During this same time period, Wheeler

notified GAC that storage charges were being assessed against
the caterpillar (R. 254-255) and Wheeler billed Terra Corporation
for those charges (Exhibit 2-D).

The lower court could have

found these circumstances suspect in light of GAC's professed
sale of the caterpillar to Terra Corporation on

July 8, i974,

and Terra Corporation's professed resale of the caterpillar to
Intervenor on July 9, 197 4. 4
Intervenor did not attempt to remove the caterpillar from
Wheeler's yard from July 9, 1974 when he allegedly purchased
the caterpillar until almost a year later in April, 1975 when
he filed his complaint in intervention in the present case.
4

Terra Corporation may argue that it incurred these added
expenses and took this added interest in the caterpillar
because of its supposed agreement to split profits with
Intervenor in the event that he resold the caterpillar.
~owever, this reasoning does not explain GAC's continued
interest in the caterpillar. Moreover, this reasoning is
inconsistent with Mr. Thomas' testimony that Terra Corporation
~as willing to sell the caterpillar for only $2,500 because
'.-t had no experience in heavy equipment dealing and because
it wanted to break even at $2,500 with its sale of the
caterpillar to Intervenor (R 308 Ls. 38-30, R. 309 Ls. 1-9.
See also R. 313 Ls. 2-9, R. 314 Ls. 9-12).
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Intervenor may argue that he was unable to remo ve th e caterpit:
because Plaintiff's counsel had instructed Wheeler
the caterpillar.

not to rel'",

~.I

However, Plaintiff's counsel had no t attach,:

the caterpillar at that point in time.

Intervenor made no

;

effort whatsoever, e.g., by legal process or even by contacti:::
I
Plaintiff's counsel, to remove the caterpillar. Indeed, after !
being notified by Wheeler in July that Plaintiff asserted an
interest in the caterpillar, Intervenor nevertheless returned
to Wyoming and solicited offers for resale of the caterpillar
(R. 291-292).

The lower court could have found that this was

abnormal behavior in light of Intervenor's professed concern
about removal of the caterpillar from Wheeler's yard.
Even as late as October, 1974, when Plaintiff

final~

threatened to attach the caterpillar, Paul Angelos, president
of GAC, and not Intervenor, responded to this threat.

Mr.

Angelos' attorney wrote to Wheeler informing them that "Paul
Angelos will deliver this letter to you and will expect to
remove the D-9 caterpillar upon paying your bill for its
repairs."

(Exhibit 6-D.

See also R. 248 Ls. 21-25.)

Again,

the lower court could have found such a letter anomalous in
light of GAC' s purported sale of the caterpillar
· July, 1974 .
Corporation in

to Terra

The lower court could have further

the caterpillar,
found it odd that the purportedly true owner Of
Intervenor, failed to take steps during this time period to
protect his interest in the caterpillar.
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L

Finally, evidence that Terra Corporation filed a
financing statement against the caterpillar after Plaintiff
attached the caterpillar (compare Exhibit 1-D and R. 13-14)
and when Terra Corporation supposedly had no further interest
in the caterpillar could have convinced the lower court that
there was a collusive scheme to defraud Plaintiff as between
GAC, Terra Corporation and Intervenor. 5
All of the facts outlined above suggest that GAC
and Terra Corporation were in constructive possession of the
caterpillar throughout 1974 and that no delivery of the
caterpillar was made to Intervenor when such delivery was
possible.

Under the mandate of

§

25-1-14 the lower court

could have treated these circumstances as conclusive evidence
of a scheme to defraud Plaintiff.
3.

Finally, there was evidence to suggest that the

principals of GAC and Terra Corporation and Intervenor were
attempting to "keep secret" their transactions with respect to
the caterpillar.

This court has also labeled these circumstances

5

.The ~ewer court's suspicions could have been further aroused
~his regard by the fact that Plaintiff was precluded from
~iling her own financing statement against the caterpillar
in the early summer of 1974 because her statement lacked the
debtor, GAC's, signature. This signature may have been
fraudulently withheld from Plaintiff
(see Affidavit of
Juanita J. Meyer in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment 11 9, R. 83-88) •
1~
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as a "badge of fraud."

See Givans v. Lambeth, 351 P.2d 95 91 Ii:

(Utah 1960) •
Plaintiff testified that she made extensive efforts
over a period of months to communicate with GAC and Terra
Corporation principals but received no response from them
329-331 and Exhibit 7-D.
Ls. 1-2) .

(R,

See also R. 331 Ls. 20-30 and R. lll

i

Intervenor's failure during this same time period,

despite his knowledge of Plaintiff's asserted claim in the
caterpillar, to come forward and notify Plaintiff of his
asserted claim in the caterpillar could have also aroused the
suspicions of the lower court.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff submits
that the trial court was justified in finding that the Terra
Corporation-Intervenor transaction was not made in "good faith''
and, therefore, violated the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act.
III.

PLAINTIFF IS NOT LIABLE TO INTERVENOR FOR WRONGFUL
OF THE CATERPILLAR.

ATTAC~1
!

Intervenor argues in his Brief at 11-12 that he ~
entitled to damages for Plaintiff's "wrongful attachment" and
"conversion" 6 of the caterpillar.

i

6
.
d a convers:\
Intervenor's complaint does not plead conversion an
or•
claim was not tried in the lower court. Therefore, Interven q,,I
.
.
.
.
.
1
see e..
cannot raise this issue for the first time on appea · h 19 101.
Simpson":· General Motors Corp:, 47? P.2d 399, 4~1 (U~af at
Examination of the two cases cited in Intervenor s Brie thus !
11-12 reveals that they are both conversion cases and are
i
inapposite.
i
1
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Intervenor's Complaint (R. 50-53) attempts to state
two claims.

The second claim is for malicious prosecution and

abuse of process.
Ls. 24-29).

Intervenor waived this claim at trial (R.233

This left Intervenor's first claim, which he

characterizes on appeal as a claim for wrongful attachment
(R.

233 L. 30 and 234 Ls. 1-4).
However, it appears that Intervenor's second claim is

in reality his claim for wrongful attachment.

"It is well

settled that an action may be maintained against the attaching
plaintiff for a wrongful and malicious attachment, this being
in the nature of a malicious prosecution or malicious abuse of
process and governed by essentially the same rules."
Attachment

§

516 at 663 (1937).

7 C.J ;s.

If so, then by waiving his

second claim at trial, Intervenor has waived his wrongful
attachment claim.
Even assuming that Intervenor has not waived and has
properly plead a wrongful attachment claim, 7 Intervenor must
show that Plaintiff was

actuated by malice or that she acted

wrongfully before he can prevail on this claim.
7
Intervenor's Complaint contains no allegation that Plaintiff
lacked probable cause in procuring her writ of attachment. One
early Utah case suggests that such an allegation is necessary to
state a claim for wrongful attachment. See Cahoon v. Hoggan,
86 P. 763, 764 (Utah 1906). But cf. Freeway Park Building, Inc. v.
Western States Wh. Sup., 451 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1969) (dictum)·
Mor7ov7r, Count I of Intervenor's Complaint does not allege t~a~
Plaintiff's attachment of the caterpillar was wrongful or malicious.
Under Utah law it is clear that such an allegation is necessary
to state a claim for wrongful attachment. See Cahoon v. Hoggan,
86 P. 763, 764 (Utah 1906). Cf. Freeway Park Building, Inc. v.
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See Cahoon v. Hoggan, 86 P. 763, 764 (Utah 1906).

See also

Freeway Park Building, Inc. v. Western States Wh. Sup., 451 P.:
778, 783

(Utah 1969)

-

(dictum) and St. Joseph Stock Yards Co,·.

Love, 195 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1921) (dictum).

There is absolutely no evidence in the record to
indicate that Plaintiff acted either wrongfully or with
malice.

The record reveals no procedural irregularities with

respect to Plaintiff's writ of attachment (R. 3-14); Terra
Corporation did not file its financing statement, thereby
giving Plaintiff constructive notice of an adverse claim oo '
the caterpillar, until after Plaintiff had obtained her writ::
attachment (compare R. 3-14 with Exhibit 1-D); and Plaintiff

j

I

testified, without contradiction, that the first time she had,,'
heard of Intervenor was when he filed his Complaint in this a:·.!
(R.

332 Ls. 3-8).

Under these circumstances, the lower court

1

!

could not have found that Plaintiff wrongfully or maliciously i
attached the caterpillar; especially in light of Plaintiff's qj
faith efforts throughout 1974 to locate individuals who clairoe:I
any interest in the caterpillar and Intervenor's unresponsiven,f
to those efforts,despite his obvious ability to respond.

I

I
I

Western States Wh. Sup., 451 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1969) (dict~,i
(" ••• the jury should have had a chance to determine wheth~f50:
not the actions of the landlord were a mere subterfuge to 'd~
the tenants and thus be unlawful and malicious under the evi ·
.
.
.
k
d co v Love,
given in this case")
and St. Joseph Stec Yar s
: ~t:
195 P.2d 305, 311 (Utah 1921) (dictum) ("Moreover, if ac~usec
is actuated by malice and acts without proba~le ~r any out::
bringing an action, and is guilty of oppression in suin~·ng
attachment, anyone may obtain relief in a proper procee /onlY I
against such malice and oppression, and may recover, no we11':
his actual damages, but may recover exemplary damages) as
See generally 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 516 at 663 (1937 ·
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Plaintiff, therefore, concludes that Intervenor's request for
damages for wrongful attachment,in the event the court chooses
to reverse on the fraudulent conveyance issue, is not well-founded.a
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff respectfully
submits that the lower court's judgment in the present case
should be affirmed.
DATED this

day of March, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,

Jerry w. James
IRVINE SMITH & MABEY
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent

8

It appears that the court could not assess damages in excess of
U.R.C.P. 64(C) (b) provides that individuals
suing for a writ of attachment must file a written undertaking.
Plaintiff has done this in the present case in the amount of
$10,000 (see Intervenor's Complaint ,f 14, R. 50-54). The Rule
~urther provides that" ... if the attachment is wrongfully
issued, the Plaintiff will pay all costs that may be awarded to
the defendant and all damages which he may sustain by reason of
the att~chment, not exceeding the sum specified in the undertaking."
(Emphasis supplied.)
$10,000 in any event.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the
day of March, 1977, two copies of the foregoing Brief were
mailed to Richard J. Leedy, Esq., 2795 Comanche Drive, Sal:
Lake City, Utah 84108.
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IN THE SUPllEME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

M. B. POWERS, JAMES M.

POWERS and VERN PETERSON,
dba POWERS AND PETERSEN,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,

AFFIDAVIT

vs.
GENE'S BUILDING MATERIALS,
INC.,
Defendant and
Appellant.

Case No. 14812

FI l ED

---------------------------------~----------------M.A.Y_~_~J8ZZ _______ _
......,_ _______________________________________=

STATE OF UTAH

Clerk, Supromo Court, Utah
SS.

County of Salt Lake
This affiant, Matt Biljanic, being first duly sworn on his oath,
deposes and says, as follows:
1.

That the affiant herein is the attorney for the Defendant/

Appellant, Gene's Building Materials, Inc.
2.

That the trial in this matter was scheduled for hearing on

September 1, 1976.

That this affiant received notification from the Clerk's

Office at approximately 9:30 A. M., September 1, 1976,

that the Honorable

Bryant H. Croft was to be the presiding judge in this case.
3.

This affiant did not have an opportunity to prepare an Affidavit

of Prejudice; however, this affiant spent twenty minutes prior to the beginning of the trial in chambers with the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, specifying
the reasona why the Honorable Bryant H. Croft should assign the case to
another judge and honor the oral request of this affiant to so remove himself.
The conference with the Honorable Bryant H. Croft was outside the presence

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of opposing counsel, based upon this affiant's judgment that the personal
feelings that might have existed between this affiant and the Court should
not have been discussed openly.
4.

That the Honorable Bryant H. Croft denied this affiants request

to withdraw from the case even though other judges were available to hear
the matter.
DATED this

d/J-

day of April, 1977.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

.;J/ef day of

April, 1977.

My Commission Expires:

~CL bfIfft)
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certliy that I mailed a true and correct cow of the foregoing Affidavit to Richard H. Thornley, attorney for Plaintlifs/Respondents,
2610 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah, 84401, postage prepaid, this

7,/{/

day of April, 1977.
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